The present article studies the correlation of true cognition not with the performance of certain cognitive or probative procedures by a subject, but with the processes occurring to the object of cognition. Therefore, the limits of truth coincide with the inexhaustible regularity or with nature in the antique, or Kant's interpretation. Opposite to science, art deals with principal singularity: its objects remain the objects of art as long as "they cannot be confused with anything else". The present article considers some "illegal" cognitive intrusions, both "leftwards" from the limits of truth where the quantum objects (ensembles) are found, and "rightwards", where the definiteness of the subject and the soul itself are determined.
knowledge and the advancement of science (and technology) have also been considered from the knowers' point of view. But what if we take a look from the position of the object of cognition, of the thing exposed to cognition?
Would it be fair to claim that true knowledge is not a significant event for the most "truly cognized", for it does not, as any other sort of knowledge that remains knowledge, change anything in the object of cognition? If the process of cognition required digging in the totality of the cognized objects, it would have been different; but fortunately, the cognition efforts do not change anything in the object of cognition.
Therefore, it means that knowledge bears a homeopathic character, while the supreme truth is transcendent.
1 This is what it is like to the left from the stable universum, when the "multiversum" has already been stopped in its endless divergence, but the truth has not been set and there is no stable being for it, because there is nothing that can be harmlessly measured yet.
Beyond the right limit knowledge loses its neutrality to the extent to which its objects turn into subjects. Here any "bringing out to the open", revelation, smelling around etc. cause ontological harm to the subject, destroying its completeness. When a subject's little shameless secret becomes known to anyone else, it turns out to cause ontological harm to itself, and sometimes the harm is irreparable.
Only that which is not directly denatured by cognition is called nature. It seems to be a nice additional definition to the "world of regularities and repetitions", i.e. to the firmly fixed and welltempered universum; it is exactly the thing that is penetrated by glancing reflection non-stop so lightly that every subsequent cognitive effort finds the object of cognition in the same state as previously. That is why the truth does not resist any tests; everything that has been counted can be counted over and over again, but it is only true when spoken of nature, of substance. It is easy to notice that both criteria of Popper, verification and falsification, comply with this principle. The latter requires the indication of a situation, let's say, of the ultimate experiment, a certain result of which proves a theory false. But if a cognitive effort and an experiment in particular are able to change the structure of the cognized, such requirement loses its sense. Because even though the dimensions of a table can be measured over and over again, it is not true for Schrödinger's cat. Together with the limits of truth, the limits of substance are defined: on one side, there is the simple supernatural, while the so-called "undernatural" remains on the other.
So, the question on whether the world is cognizable or not, should be answered as follows: yes, to the extent it is not destructed by any measurements and other cognitive efforts. Of course, here one can speak of a weird paradox: as though, asking whether a mushroom is edible or not, one gets the answer that it is edible to the extent it is protected from being eaten. Though it seems funny, this is exactly how it is with the cognizable world. It means that either the world is so radically different from a mushroom, which is hardly true, or cognition has nothing in common with eating, which is something we have to admit. We also have to assume that cognition is a sort of "anti-interaction" while truth is the edibility of the mushrooms that have not been eaten. Therefore the limits of truth obtain some additional determination.
If so, the truth is also a function of time, or, to be more precise, of chronopoesis; it does not become possible and determined at once.
At first it requires the performance of some It brings us to some curious conclusions of both practical and metaphysical kind. Thus, if "nature" is an oasis of harmless measurability and it is the only reason why true cognition is possible in its regard, then the "world of the done" is something like a reserve within a reserved nature (Mamardashvili M.K., 1984) . The done is the limited territory of the truth, as within its limits it is possible to measure and reproduce as much as one wishes: the object are cut out for this.
That is why Mamardashvili was right when he said that it is not the done that we cognize, but it is by means of the done that we do it: for example, we search for the analogues of the done in nature and measure them like the things from the human everyday life. Mature nature is exposable to such procedures, as it has the set limit of truth, though the reference of truth is beyond it.
Art has a different status: it is different and it has to be dramatically different from the done; it is not "man-made". In his time Yu.M. Lotman The paradox of singularity in art is comparable to wave-particle duality. Here is an object of art, for example, a sculpture in a city park. First of all, this object is not separated from non-art: the paths leading to it, the ice-cream wraps and rocks, the grass around it are not art. This far, the conditions for truth and art are the same. But being an object of art, the sculpture is singular: if we find it in another park, and then in a third one and in any park in general, it will not be an object of art anymore: it will be considered to be a simple attribute of park like grass, trees and paths. As for truth, the opposite is right: if we do not find the truth surrounded by the same environment, if we come across it only from time to time, it cannot be considered truth at all. This is the difference of the fine (the beauty) from the objective truth. This was addressed to Anna Kern, thereby revealing and immortalizing her singularity.
She is the only woman, the image and the cause of it; she is the lost physical singularity that has not left the poetic singularity no matter how many times the poem is re-typed: it never loses its sacred power. But let us suppose that a biographer of Pushkin discovers that the poet had a custom to send this very poem to any conquered woman after an erotic act: "A magic we could say that all copies are just printouts, while the original in its legal appearance is nothing but a privileged printout, like the one we cannot point at. This is where the stored art and created art makeup different echelons: instead of an object of art we get a copy or a sample, but it only means that the new, created work of art will be recognized as such only when it deserves being copied, considering that every copy is not a work of art any more. It opens space for a great number of remarks, for example: the world can remain cognizable even if it is not being cognized, if the act of cognition is deposited in such a way that it will occur sooner or later. But a work of art cannot remain unique (and even remain art) if it is not copied at least on the level of perception. I.e. its involvement in temporal relations is set in a stricter way.
Moving further, let us study the frontier cases of non-copying and copying of art, that transform singularity into regularity. Art is found in between them, i.e., like truth, art has its limits.
On the left there is the "non-art" recognized as such for the reason of its "unartfulness', such as graphomania, cacophony, kitsch… Such opuses are not copied or reproduced at least because it never enters anyone's mind. On the right we deal with industry where copying destructs (eliminates) the singularity of the object, due to which, despite its "artfulness", the object, let it be earrings, stunningly beautiful wallpaper, an exquisite bag, remains nothing but "fashion jewellery". With all these differences and oppositions we get two mushrooms that seem edible for the reason of their "uneatenness"; the truth is inexhaustible regularity, and art is inexhaustible singularity. It is also important to remark that the regularity and singularity themselves can also be exhaustible. Thus, the routine human The Einselection procedure, i.e. determined selection (selection for cognition, for example), brings to "breaking the completeness" of the object. The favourite example of such in quantum mechanics is Schrödinger's cat.
